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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purpose of Study 
The goal of the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) Project of the NASA’s Aviation 
Safety Program (AvSP) is to “enable a reduction in accidents and incidents through enhanced 
vehicle design, structure, systems, and operating concepts” (Ref. 1). The VSST has three 
technical challenges contributing to this goal: 
 TC1:  Improve Crew Decision-Making and Response in Complex Situations (CDM) 
TC2:  Maintain Vehicle Safety between Major Inspections (MVS) 
TC3:  Assure Safe and Effective Aircraft Control under Hazardous Conditions (ASC) 
The VSST management team uses systems analysis (1) “to provide independent information 
regarding the projected impact of the VSST research portfolio on its aviation safety goals”; and 
(2) “to identify key issues and maintain a research portfolio leading to potential solutions to the 
three challenges” (Ref. 1). To assist the management in achieving these objectives, several 
systems analysis milestones have been specified in the VSST project plan. The systems analysis 
milestone for fiscal year (FY) 2014 is focused on the MVS Technical Challenge. The goal of 
MVS is to “develop and demonstrate new integrated health management and failure prevention 
technologies to assure the integrity of vehicle systems between major inspection intervals and 
maintain vehicle state awareness during flight” (Ref. 1). The expected research outcome of the 
MVS TC is the set of six research products listed in Table 1. 
  
 2 
 
Table 1. MVS List of Research Products 
MAINTAIN VEHICLE SAFETY BETWEEN MAJOR INSPECTION (MVS) 
MVS-1.1 Hybrid Structural Damage 
Diagnosis 
Assessment of airframe structural health via 
sensors coupled with rapid large area inspection 
methods. 
 
MVS-1.2 Integrated Sensing and 
Healing System (ISHS) 
Integration of self-healing materials that enable 
early detection of damage precursors, and 
increase durability and damage tolerance of 
airframes. 
 
MVS-2.1 Vehicle Integrated 
Propulsion Research (VIPR) 
Technologies developed under this element 
diagnose and monitor propulsion system in real-
time, and mitigate potential issues through easily 
integrated, small, and low weight sensors 
avoiding costly retrofits while maintaining safety.  
 
MVS-2.2 Mitigating Turbomachinery 
Structural Failure 
This technology will enable advanced inspection 
methods for recently implemented engine 
material technologies as well as robust engine 
material design methods for future emerging 
technologies. 
 
MVS-3.1 Vehicle-Level Diagnostics 
and Integration 
Integration of diagnostic data to provide an 
overall assessment of the vehicle state to identify 
potential maintenance and safety issues between 
inspections. 
 
MVS-3.2 Physics-Based Models and 
Algorithms for Wiring Fault 
Detection 
Combination of physics-based model and 
probabilistic fault detection algorithm to diagnose 
and identify chafed wires and degraded 
connectors for electrical wiring and interconnect 
systems (EWIS). 
 
 
As detailed in the VSST project plan (Ref. 1), the MVS TC is described as follows: 
“MVS research centers around preventing vehicle failures, as well as quickly detecting and 
containing them when they do occur. MVS addresses critical risks for maintaining vehicle safety. 
The greatest amount of information about an airplane’s current health is currently obtained 
during major inspections. These inspections are thorough, costly, and are performed at set 
intervals based on fleet-wide averages for system and component reliability. There is a generous 
safety margin built into these intervals, but there are occasions where problems can come up 
during operations that were undetected at the last major inspection. MVS works to provide 
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information on potential safety-related systems problems to support in-flight decision-making 
and targeted maintenance that can address these problems. It accomplishes this goal through 
integrated systems consisting of high-capability sensors and diagnostic algorithms. It also 
develops capabilities to help preclude some of the most critical failures that can arise.” 
A summary of the goals, objectives, and products for the MVS TC are graphically depicted using 
an objectives tree format (Ref. 2) in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. MVS Objectives Tree 
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The specific MVS related FY14 systems analysis milestone is stated below: 
1) Deliver analysis of trends in aviation as related to vehicle health management (VHM) by 
reviewing the most current statistical and prognostics data available about accidents and 
incidents related to VHM areas. 
2) Deliver assessment of future directions in aviation technology related to VHM research 
areas through review of literature from academia, industry and other government 
agencies to establish requirements for future work in VHM. 
1.2. Overview of Study Contents 
The outcomes of this study are addressed in the next sections and in sequential order. Outcome 1 
is given in Section 2, which contains a summary of statistical analyses of accident and incident 
data that has been conducted by NASA researchers. Outcome 2 is addressed in Section 3, which 
is a summary of vehicle health assurance issues and future research needs that were derived from 
literature reviews, databases, and aviation subject-matter experts. Finally, Section 4 discusses 
and concludes the study. 
 
2. SUMMARY OF NASA STATISTICAL STUDIES 
Systems analysis personnel within the NASA AvSP have recently conducted statistical analyses 
of accident and incident data that are related to the MVS Technical Challenge. This section 
summarizes the results of these analyses. 
2.1. Analysis of NTSB/FAA Data 
A recent study has been conducted using accident data from the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident and Incident Data System (restricted to 1996-2010), and 
incident data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Accident/Incident Data System 
(restricted to 1996-2010), especially those related to system/component failures/malfunctions 
(SCFM).  
The information the NTSB investigators collect during their investigations of these aviation 
events resides in the NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data System. A copy of this database 
in Microsoft Access format was obtained from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and 
Sharing (ASIAS) department of the FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety in June 2012. At that point 
in time, the NTSB investigation was not complete for a substantial number of 2011 accidents, 
particularly those which occurred toward the end of the year. For this reason, all work on the 
database was restricted to 1986-2010, which was primarily an update of two years beyond the 
previous working version of the data the systems analysis personnel maintain. The update 
process requires several months of cross-checking various data elements and attempting to fill in 
any missing data, followed by the assignment of occurrence categories to each accident.  
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The NTSB database includes events involving a wide variety of aircraft (airplanes, helicopters, 
hot air balloons, gliders, ultralight, etc.) with operations conducted under various Federal 
Aviation Regulations (Part 91: General Aviation, Part 121: Commercial Air Carriers, Part 129: 
Foreign Air Carriers, Part 135: Commuters and On-Demand Air Taxis, Part 137: Agricultural 
Operations, etc.). The NTSB considers each event to be either an accident or an incident, with 
their definitions defined in Ref. 3. The NTSB does not investigate all incidents, but incidents as 
well as accidents are reported to the FAA by pilots, airport personnel and private citizens.  
The FAA maintains a database with the information that they receive in these reports and collect 
in their investigations. A copy of the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS) was 
obtained from Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) in July of 2011, 
which was late enough in the year that nearly all incidents from 2010 had been investigated. The 
current working copy of the AIDS database includes incidents from 1985-2010. A recent 
separate analysis showed substantial differences in several accident characteristics in the data 
prior to 1996. As such, for this analysis the decision was made to select the most recently 
available fifteen years’ worth of data (1996-2010).  
In 2008, the FAA revised the amount of data recorded for each incident, making the database 
even less informative. Some of the data fields are now blank for the most recent incidents. One 
of those fields was previously used to determine which of the Part 135 flights were scheduled 
and which were non-scheduled. As a result, it is not possible to present incident data separately 
for scheduled versus non-scheduled Part 135 operations among incidents later than 2007. For 
most of this report, the Part 135 incident data are restricted to 1996-2007 and all data from 2008-
2010 are ignored. 
In order to describe the types of aircraft which were involved in these accidents and incidents, 
the specific aircraft make and model (and in many cases, aircraft series) was determined for each 
accident and nearly all incidents. For the vast majority of events, this information could be easily 
found in the data record. For some events it was necessary to consult the FAA’s aircraft registry 
database. 
All aircraft in the data system for the chosen time period (1996-2010) were divided into groups 
based on some combination of engine type, aircraft use, aircraft size, and aircraft complexity. 
The aircraft categories are as follows: 
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? Jet engine 
o Wide Body Jet Airliners 
o Narrow Body Jet Airliners 
o Regional Jets 
o Medium Sized Business Jets 
o Small Business Jets (maximum takeoff weight <= 12,500 lbs) 
? Turbo-prop engine  
o Large Turbo-props (maximum takeoff weight >= 32,000 lbs and more than 30 seats) 
o Medium Turbo-props (12,500< maximum takeoff weight <32,000 lbs or 15-30 seats) 
o Small Turbo-props (maximum takeoff weight <12,500 lbs and less than 15 seats) 
? Reciprocating engine 
o Heavier multiple reciprocating engines (maximum takeoff weight >15,000 lbs) 
o Lighter multiple reciprocating engines (maximum takeoff weight < 15,000 lbs) 
o Single reciprocating engine, retractable landing gear 
o Single reciprocating engine, fixed landing gear 
o Light Sport Aircraft  
 
The systems involved in the failures and malfunctions are presented separately in Section 2.1.1 
for four categories of flight operations (Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Non-Scheduled Part 135, 
and Part 91). A separate analysis looks at SCFM in different categories of aircraft type in Section 
2.1.2. 
2.1.1. System/Component Failures/Malfunctions by Operation Category 
This section examines system/component failure/malfunction (SCFM) by flight operations. A 
summary of the SCFM events can be found in Table 2. The incident data for Part 135 are from 
1996-2007 only. Across all operation categories, between 15 and 22 percent of accidents (row 
“Accidents with SCFM”) during 1996-2010 involved a failure or malfunction of some aircraft 
system or component. The lowest proportion of accidents and fatal accidents associated with 
SCFM was in Part 91 (12-15%, column “Part 91”), while the lowest percentage of fatalities was 
in Scheduled Part 135 (9%). Among Part 121 flights, SCFM accounted for 16 percent of all 
accidents, 36 percent of fatal accidents, and 66 percent of all fatalities. In Part 135 flights, SCFM 
accounted for 19 to 22 percent of all accidents, 18 to 19 percent of fatal accidents, and 9 to 19 
percent of all fatalities. Between 36 and 62 percent of all incidents included SCFM across all 
operation categories; the lowest percentage again was within Part 91. 
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Table 2. Summary of System/Component Failure/Malfunction Accidents and Incidents 
by Operation Category 
 
 
For each accident and incident, the system affected by the malfunction or failure was determined 
(see Table 3). In some events multiple systems were affected, and in these cases the first system 
affected was selected. For example, if an electrical malfunction preceded an engine fire, that 
event was categorized under “Electrical”. Engine and landing gear failures/malfunctions 
combined (highlighted rows) for between 56 and 69 percent of all SCFM accidents, and between 
48 and 79 percent of all SCFM incidents. No other single system accounted for more than fifteen 
percent of the failure/malfunction accidents or incidents. 
  
Type of Event Part 121 
Part 135—
Scheduled 
Part 135—
Non-Scheduled 
Part 91 
Total Accidents 619 108 768 17,628 
Accidents with SCFM 97 (15.7%) 20 (18.5%) 167 (21.7%) 2,581 (14.6%) 
Fatal Accidents 36 16 173 3,260 
Fatal SCFM 
Accidents out of all 
Fatal Accidents  
13 (36.1%) 3 (18.8%) 31 (17.9%) 387 (11.9%) 
Total Fatalities 1,190 94 427 6,295 
Fatalities in accidents 
with SCFM 
782 (65.7%) 8 (8.5%) 81 (19.0%) 811 (12.9%) 
Total Incidents 4,890 295 1,343 17,411 
Incidents with SCFM 3008 (61.5%) 180 (61.0%) 759 (56.5%) 6323 (36.3%) 
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Table 3. Initial System Affected by Failure or Malfunction in Accidents and Incidents, 
 by Operation Category (with tall poles highlighted) 
 
 
For the purpose of further examination, the systems were divided into four groups (engine or fuel 
system, flight controls or structure, landing gear or hydraulics, and everything else). In the 
majority of accidents and incidents involving flight control failures or malfunctions, the issue 
was with the control surface itself, or with a cable leading to the control surface, rather than with 
the switch, selector or computer which controlled the movement of the surface; thus, it seemed 
reasonable to group these with other structural (mostly wing) failures. Similarly, most cases of 
System Part 121 
Part 135—
Scheduled 
Part 135—
Non-
Scheduled 
Part 91 
Total SCFM Accidents 97 20 167 2581 
Electrical   8 (8.2%) 1 (5.0%)   7 (4.2%)  110 (4.3%) 
Engine 28 (28.9%) 7 (35.0%) 60 (35.9%) 1,133 (43.9%) 
Flight Controls   7 (7.2%) 1 (5.0%)   8 (4.8%)  144 (5.6%) 
Fuel   1 (1.0%) 1 (5.0%) 12 (7.2%)  226 (8.8%) 
Hydraulic   9 (9.3%) 1 (5.0%) 10 (6.0%)    63 (2.4%) 
Instrumentation/ 
Communication/Navigation 
  2 (2.1%) 1 (5.0%)   0 (0.0%)    28 (1.1%) 
Landing Gear 26 (26.8%) 6 (30.0%) 54 (32.3%)  635 (24.6%) 
Structure   6 (6.2%) 0 (0.0%)   9 (5.4%)  185 (7.2%) 
Other 10 (10.3%) 2 (10.0%)   5 (3.0%)    36 (1.4%) 
Unknown   0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)   2 (1.2%)    20 (0.8%) 
Total SCFM Incidents 3,008 180 759 6,323 
Electrical 133 (4.4%)   8 (4.4%)   36 (4.7%)   479 (7.6%) 
Engine 834 (27.7%) 48 (26.7%) 211 (27.8%) 1,729 (27.3%) 
Flight Controls 309 (10.3%) 11 (6.1%)   14 (1.8%)   124 (2.0%) 
Fuel 103 (3.4%)   6 (3.3%)   29 (3.8%)   249 (3.9%) 
Hydraulic 234 (7.8%) 11 (6.1%)   30 (4.0%)   160 (2.5%) 
Instrumentation/ 
Communication/Navigation 
 45 (1.5%)   2 (1.1%)    5 (0.7%)     44 (0.7%) 
Landing Gear 612 (20.3%) 64 (35.6%) 352 (46.4%) 3,288 (52.0%) 
Structure 128 (4.3%) 13 (7.2%)   37 (4.9%)   114 (1.8%) 
Other 610 (20.3%) 17 (9.4%)   45 (5.9%)   136 (2.2%) 
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hydraulic failure led to the inoperability of the landing gear or brakes, providing a natural link 
between those two systems. 
Table 4. Event Characteristics by Failure/Malfunction System Group and by Operation 
Category 
 
System Group 
Event 
Characteristics 
Part 121 
Part 135—
Scheduled 
Part 135— 
Non-
Scheduled 
Part 91 
Engine or Fuel 
System 
Total Accidents 29 8 72 1359 
Fatal Accidents 4 (13.8%) 1 (12.5%) 14 (19.4%) 
180 
(13.2%) 
Total Fatalities 42 2 41 354 
Aircraft Destroyed 3 (10.3%) 1 (12.5%) 15 (20.8%) 
213 
(15.7%) 
Flight Controls 
or Structure 
Total Accidents 13 1 17 329 
Fatal Accidents 5 (38.5%) 0 10 (58.8%) 
163 
(49.5%) 
Total Fatalities 397 0 24 358 
Aircraft Destroyed 5 (38.5%) 0 8 (47.1%) 
141 
(42.9%) 
Landing Gear or 
Hydraulic 
Total Accidents 35 7 64 698 
Fatal Accidents 0 1 (14.3%) 1 (1.6%) 1 (0.1%) 
Total Fatalities 0 5 4 2 
Aircraft Destroyed 0 1 (14.3%) 2 (3.1%) 11 (1.6%) 
Instrumentation, 
Communication, 
Navigation, 
Electrical, 
Other, 
Unknown 
Total Accidents 20 4 14 195 
Fatal Accidents 4 (20.0%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (42.9%) 43 (22.1%) 
Total Fatalities 343 1 12 97 
Aircraft Destroyed 6 (30.0%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (35.7%) 62 (31.8%) 
 
Table 4 shows the number of accidents, the number of fatal accidents, the total number of 
fatalities, and the proportion of aircraft destruction in each group of the accidents. Flight 
control/structural failures/malfunctions accounted for less than fifteen percent of SCFM 
accidents (from Table 3) but were the most deadly of the four groups (between 39 and 59 percent 
of fatal accidents from Table 4), and in general the most likely to result in aircraft destruction 
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(between 39 and 47 percent of aircraft destroyed). Landing gear/hydraulic malfunctions were 
very rarely fatal, regardless of flight operation, and rarely resulted in aircraft destruction. 
Fatalities and aircraft destruction associated with engine/fuel system malfunctions were more 
likely than with landing gear/hydraulic failures, but less likely than either of the other two 
groups.  
Figures 2-5 compare the number of accidents for each group of initially affected systems across 
three time periods. Among Part 121 accidents (Figure 2), flight control/structural malfunctions 
occurred the least in every time period, but decreased less over time than the other categories. 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Part 121. 
 
Among Scheduled Part 135 accidents (Figure 3), only one accident included a flight 
control/structural malfunction (a jammed control yoke), and the number of engine/fuel system 
failures/malfunctions did not decrease over time. Among Non-Scheduled Part 135 accidents 
(Figure 4),  the number of engine/fuel system  malfunctions decreased substantially over time, 
and the number of flight control/structural malfunctions decreased slightly. In Part 91 (Figure 5),  
the number of flight control/structural malfunctions, and also the number of landing 
gear/hydraulic malfunctions, has remained nearly constant, while the number of engine/fuel 
system  malfunctions has declined. 
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Figure 3. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Scheduled Part 135. 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Non-Scheduled Part 135. 
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Figure 5. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Part 91. 
Figures 6-9 compare the number of incidents in each of the four groups of initially affected 
systems across three time periods. Among Part 121 and Part 135 incidents (Figures 6, 7, and 8), 
malfunctions in all four groups have decreased over time. In Part 91 (Figure 9), the number of 
flight control/structural malfunctions has been consistently low, and the incidence of all other 
malfunctions and failures has declined. 
 
Figure 6. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Part 121. 
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Figure 7. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Scheduled Part 135. 
 
Figure 8. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Non-Scheduled Part 135. 
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Figure 9. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Part 91. 
2.1.2. System/Component Failures/Malfunctions by Aircraft Category 
This section examines SCFM within aircraft engine types, rather than flight operation. A full 
breakdown analysis of aircraft categories based on some combination of engine type, aircraft 
use, aircraft size, and aircraft complexity involved in the 1996-2010 accidents and incidents can 
be found in Ref. 3. The data were grouped in this section as follows: 
 
1. Jet Engine Aircraft 
2. Turbo-Prop Engine Aircraft 
3. Reciprocating Engine Aircraft 
o Multiple Reciprocating Engine  
o Single Reciprocating Engine 
 
Figure 10 shows accident volumes of engine types by operation category. Jet aircraft were 
involved in 81 percent of Part 121 accidents. In contrast, 87 percent of Part 91 accidents involved 
aircraft with a single reciprocating engine, with 9 percent of the aircraft having multiple 
reciprocating engines and the remaining 4 percent spread out over the other 2 engine types. 
Scheduled Part 135 accidents occurred on basically three engine types, none of them jets: turbo-
props (30%), multiple reciprocating engines (30%) and single reciprocating engines (41%).  
Non-Scheduled Part 135 accidents predominantly involved aircraft with reciprocating engines, 
either single (40%) or multiple (31%), although nearly eight percent of the accident aircraft were 
jets and 21 percent had turbo-prop engines. 
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Figure 10. Summary of Engine Type in Accidents by Operation Category. 
A similar summary of the engine types involved in the incidents can be found in Figure 11. 
Seventy-three percent of Part 121 incidents occurred on flights with jet aircraft. In contrast, 
aircraft with reciprocating engine were involved in 91 percent of Part 91 incidents and 57 percent 
of Non-Scheduled Part 135 incidents. Twenty-three percent of Non-Scheduled Part 135 incidents 
occurred on flights with turbo-prop engines, and another 19 percent occurred in jet aircraft. Fifty-
one percent of Scheduled Part 135 incidents occurred on turbo-props, and another 45 percent in 
aircraft with reciprocating engines. 
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Figure 11. Summary of Engine Type in Incidents by Operation Category. 
Table 5 summarizes the accident and incident data within the above engine types regardless of 
flight operation categories. Eighteen percent of jet and turbo-prop accidents (row “Accidents 
with SCFM”) included a system/component failure/malfunction. The highest proportions of fatal 
accidents and fatalities were in jets (20% in fatal accidents, and 54% in fatalities). In contrast, the 
lowest percentages of fatal accidents and fatalities were in single-engine aircraft (12% and 13%, 
respectively). 
Ninety percent of the reciprocating engine aircraft involved in accidents had a single engine 
(15,685/17,523); however, single engine accidents involving SCFM occurred less frequently 
(14%) than SCFM accidents with multiple engine aircraft (22%).  
Twenty-two percent of multiple-engine (reciprocating) aircraft accidents involved SCFM; this 
was the highest percentage among all engine types (row “Accidents with SCFM”). Interestingly, 
the lowest percentage was associated with single-engine aircraft (14 percent). Among incidents 
(row “Incidents with SCFM”), however, 58 to 61 percent of jet, turbo-prop, and multiple-engine 
(reciprocating) aircraft incidents involved SCFM, compared with 31 percent for single-engine 
incidents. 
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Table 5. Summary of System/Component Failure/Malfunction Accidents and Incidents by 
Engine type 
 
 
Table 6 shows the first system involved in a failure or malfunction for the accidents and 
incidents, broken down by engine type. Engine and landing gear failures/malfunctions combined 
for between 56 and 69 percent of all SCFM accidents, and between 49 and 84 percent of all 
SCFM incidents. No other single system accounted for more than fifteen percent of the 
failure/malfunction accidents or incidents. There were no fuel system malfunctions among 
accidents in jet aircraft during 1996-2010. 
  
Type of Event Jet Engines 
Turbo-Prop 
Engines 
Multiple 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
Single 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
All 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
Total Accidents 786 814 1,838 15,685 17,523 
Accidents with 
SCFM 
142 (18%) 149 (18%) 409 (22%) 2,165 (14%) 2,574 (15%) 
Fatal Accidents 85 240 590 2,570 3,160 
Fatal SCFM 
Accidents out of 
all Fatal 
Accidents  
17 (20%) 32 (13%) 88 (15%) 297 (12%) 385 (12%) 
Total Fatalities 1,416 767 1,267 4,556 5,823 
Fatalities in 
accidents with 
SCFM 
767 (54%) 126 (16%) 208 (16%) 581 (13%) 789 (14%) 
Total Incidents 4,722 2,437 3,624 13,270 16,894 
Incidents with 
SCFM 
2,741 
(58%) 
1,484 
(61%) 
2,088 (58%) 4,073 (31%) 6,161 (36%) 
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Table 6. Initial System Affected by Failure or Malfunction in Accidents and Incidents, 
 by Engine type (with tall poles highlighted) 
 
 
 
  
System 
Jet 
Engines 
Turbo-
Prop 
Engines 
Multiple 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
Single 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
All 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
Total SCFM Accidents 142 149 409 2,165 2,574 
Electrical 12 (8%) 4 (3%) 16 (4%) 94 (4%) 110 (4%) 
Engine 26 (18%) 51 (34%) 113 (28%) 1,038 (48%) 1,151 (45%) 
Flight Controls 13 (9%) 10 (7%) 19 (5%) 118 (5%) 137 (5%) 
Fuel 0 (0%) 8 (5%) 28 (7%) 204 (9%) 232 (9%) 
Hydraulic 17 (12%) 8 (5%) 12 (3%) 46 (2%) 58 (2%) 
Instrumentation/ 
Communication/ 
Navigation 
3 (2%) 3 (2%) 8 (2%) 17 (1%) 25 (1%) 
Landing Gear 54 (38%) 46 (31%) 167 (41%) 454 (21%) 621 (24%) 
Structure 5 (4%) 13 (9%) 34 (8%) 148 (7%) 182 (7%) 
Other 11 (8%) 6 (4%) 7 (2%) 30 (1%) 37 (1%) 
Unknown 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 5 (1%) 16 (1%) 21 (1%) 
Total SCFM Incidents 2,741 1,484 2,088 4,073 6,161 
Electrical 122 (4%) 59 (4%) 109 (5%) 369 (9%) 478 (8%) 
Engine 
703 
(26%) 
403 
(27%) 
367 (18%) 1,369 (34%) 1,736 (28%) 
Flight Controls 
276 
(10%) 
87 (6%) 29 (1%) 69 (2%) 98 (2%) 
Fuel 92 (3%) 46 (3%) 46 (2%) 204 (5%) 250 (4%) 
Hydraulic 205 (7%) 97 (7%) 78 (4%) 63 (2%) 141 (2%) 
Instrumentation/ 
Communication/ 
Navigation 
32 (1%) 28 (2%) 5 (0%) 30 (1%) 35 (1%) 
Landing Gear 
633 
(23%) 
461 
(31%) 
1,390 (67%) 1,893 (46%) 3,283 (53%) 
Structure 126 (5%) 100 (7%) 39 (2%) 35 (1%) 74 (1%) 
Other 
552 
(20%) 
203 
(14%) 
25 (1%) 41 (1%) 66 (1%) 
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As before, the systems were divided into four groups (engine or fuel system, flight controls or 
structure, landing gear or hydraulics, and everything else).  Table 7 shows various characteristics 
of accidents in these four groups, by aircraft groups determined by the type of engine. Among jet 
aircraft, the most frequently affected systems are landing gear or hydraulic, whereas engine or 
fuel system malfunctions are by far most frequent among aircraft with reciprocating engines 
(row “Total Accidents”). In turbo-props, these two groups are similar. Regardless of engine type, 
flight controls or structural malfunctions are most likely, and landing gear or hydraulic failures 
least likely, to lead to fatal injuries and aircraft destruction (rows “Fatal Accidents” and “Aircraft 
Destroyed”). 
 
Table 7. Event Characteristics by Failure/Malfunction System Group and by Engine Type 
 
System Group 
Event 
Characteristics 
Jet Engines 
Turbo-Prop 
Engines 
Reciprocating 
Engines 
Engine or Fuel 
System 
Total Accidents 26 59 1383 
Fatal Accidents 4 (15.4%) 10 (16.9%) 185 (13.4%) 
Total Fatalities 45 29 365 
Aircraft Destroyed 3 (11.5%) 15 (25.4%) 214 (15.5%) 
Flight Controls or 
Structure 
Total Accidents 18 23 319 
Fatal Accidents 6 (33.3%) 14 (60.9%) 158 (49.5%) 
Total Fatalities 367 69 343 
Aircraft Destroyed 6 (33.3%) 13 (56.5%) 135 (42.3%) 
Landing Gear or 
Hydraulic 
Total Accidents 71 54 679 
Fatal Accidents 1 (1.4%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (0.1%) 
Total Fatalities 4 5 2 
Aircraft Destroyed 1 (1.4%) 1 (1.9%) 12 (1.8%) 
Instrumentation, 
Communication, 
Navigation, 
Electrical, Other, 
Unknown 
Total Accidents 27 13 193 
Fatal Accidents 6 (22.2%) 7 (53.8%) 41 (21.2%) 
Total Fatalities 351 23 79 
Aircraft Destroyed 8 (29.6%) 5 (38.5%) 61 (31.6%) 
 
Figures 12-15 compare the number of accidents in these four system groups across three time 
periods by engine type. Figures 16-19 similarly compare the number of incidents. Among jet 
aircraft (Figure 12), the number of landing gear/hydraulic malfunctions decreased over time, but 
remained the most frequent type of malfunction. The other three system groups did not change 
substantially, but all were least frequent during 2001-2005. 
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Figure 12. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Jet Aircraft. 
Among turbo-prop aircraft (Figure 13), flight controls/structural malfunctions have increased, 
while engine/fuel and landing gear/hydraulic malfunctions have decreased. 
 
Figure 13. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Turbo-Prop Aircraft. 
Among multiple reciprocating engine aircraft (Figure 14), landing gear/hydraulic malfunctions 
have increased, while engine/fuel malfunctions have decreased. The number of flight 
controls/structural malfunctions has not changed much. 
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Figure 14. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Multiple Reciprocating Engine Aircraft. 
Among single reciprocating engine aircraft (Figure 15), engine/fuel malfunctions have decreased 
substantially, while all other types of malfunctions have decreased only slightly. 
 
Figure 15. Number of Accidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Single Reciprocating Engine Aircraft. 
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The number of incidents in all four system groups decreased over time for all engine types 
(Figures 16-19). The general trend was that within each time period, the descending order by 
frequency was landing gear/hydraulic, engine/fuel, other, and flight controls/structural. An 
exception to this general trend was for jet aircraft during 1996-2000, where engine/fuel 
malfunctions were the most frequent.  
 
Figure 16. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Jet Aircraft. 
 
Figure 17. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Turbo-Prop Aircraft. 
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Figure 18. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Twin Reciprocating Engine Aircraft. 
 
Figure 19. Number of Incidents in Groups of Initially Affected Systems Across Three Time 
Periods for Single Reciprocating Engine Aircraft. 
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2.2. Analysis of ASRS Data 
AvSP systems analysis personnel have recently conducted a study of the NASA Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) incident data. The incidents in the ASRS are reported voluntarily, and 
are subject to self-reporting biases. These incidents are not verified by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) or the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Voluntary incident 
reports cannot be considered a representative sample of the underlying population of events they 
describe (Ref. 4). As such, this data cannot be used for statistical or trend analysis, but more for 
identifying vulnerabilities and gain a better understanding of the root causes of incidents and 
should be considered to compliment the data generated by mandatory, statistical, and monitoring 
systems. 
The aircraft related incidents with known SCFM system categories were analyzed. There were 
20,874 SCFM-related incidents (or reports) for Part 121, 135 and 91 operations during the time 
period from January 1993 through December 2012.  Seventy-three percent of reported incidents 
were for Part 121, 5% for Part 135, and 22% for Part 91. Prior to March 1997, Part 121 
operations included aircraft with 30 or more seats.  In March 1997, the definition of Part 121 
operations changed and now includes those aircraft with ten or more seats.    
The SCFM categories used in the analysis are the following, in alphabetical order: 
1. Automated Flight Controls 
2. Brakes 
3. Communication 
4. Control Surface 
5. Electrical / Power 
6. Environmental Control System 
7. Fuel System 
8. Furnishings and Equipment 
9. Hydraulics / Pneumatic 
10. Icing 
11. Landing Gear 
12. Miscellaneous 
13. Monitoring and Management 
14. Navigation 
15. Oil System 
16. Propulsion System 
17. Structures 
18. Weather System 
 
The aircraft related incidents were further identified in the ASRS dataset as having either critical 
or less severe aircraft equipment problems. When aircraft related incidents were caused by 
system component failure or malfunction, about 76% of the time they were identified as having a 
critical aircraft equipment problem. In addition to aircraft equipment problems, ASRS data 
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provided the event results of the aircraft related incidents. The incidents can result in 
maintenance action, in unrelated maintenance action, or contained no information. For years 
prior to 1999, the maintenance action was not recorded in ASRS. Therefore, there were only 
9,822 SCFM-related incident reports available. The incidents resulting in maintenance action 
were applicable to the “Maintain Vehicle Safety between Major Inspections (MVS)” Technical 
Challenge. As such, they were included in the analyses.  
Results 
Analysis of trends in the number of aircraft related incidents with known SCFM over the past 20 
years (January 1993 through December 2012) can be seen in Figure 20. Part 121 had fewer 
reported incidents during 1993-1997, got higher during 1998-2002, dropped slightly during 
2003-2007, and increased significantly during 2008-2012. Part 135 had a slight decreasing trend 
from 1993 to 2007, but a slight increase during the past 5 years. The slight decrease from 1993-
1997 to 1998-2002 may be due to the definition change in March 1997 making a shift from Part 
135 volume to Part 121 volume. Part 91 had a rather flat trend from 1993 to 2007, but had an 
increase during the past 5 years. 
 
Figure 20. Incidents related to SCFM over four time periods 
 
The number of incidents related to SCFM with an identified aircraft equipment problem over the 
time periods can be seen in Figure 21. Trends for critical equipment problem were similar to 
those without identified equipment problem (Figure 20). For less severe equipment problem 
(Figure 21b), Part 121 stayed rather flat from 1993 to 2007, and increased significantly during 
2008-2012. Part 135 had a similar trend as its critical equipment problem. Part 91 had a slightly 
decreasing trend from 1993 to 2007, and had a significant increase during the past 5 years. 
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The number of incidents related to SCFM resulting in maintenance action over the time periods 
can be seen in Figure 22. Part 121 had fewer reported incidents during 2003-2007, and an 
increased trend during 2008-2012. Part 135 had a slightly decreasing trend from 1999 to 2002, 
and a flat trend from 2003 to 2012. Part 91 had a rather flat trend from 1999 to 2012.  
 
 
(a) Critical aircraft equipment problem 
 
(b) Less severe aircraft equipment problem 
Figure 21.  Incidents related to SCFM with identified aircraft equipment problem over 
four time periods 
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Figure 22. Number of incidents resulting in maintenance action over three time periods 
Analysis of trends in the number of incidents broken down by SCFM category is assessed next. 
Table 8 compares SCFM categories with different identified aircraft equipment problems. 
Because each level of equipment problems had different numbers of incidents, percent incidents 
by SCFM categories were computed with respect to each equipment problem. Therefore, the 
total percent over all categories for any given equipment problem and any given FAR Part is 100 
percent. The SCFM tall poles (highlighted cells) for incidents identified as having critical aircraft 
equipment problems were the same as those for all incidents regardless of aircraft equipment 
problems (i.e., column “Critical + Less Severe”) across all FAR Parts. 
For incidents with critical aircraft equipment problems, Part 121 had propulsion system, control 
surface, and monitoring and management as the top three tall poles. Part 135 had propulsion 
system, landing gear, and monitoring and management as the top three tall poles. Part 91 had 
propulsion system, landing gear, and electrical or power as the top three tall poles. Across all 
FAR Parts, propulsion system was the tallest pole.  
For Part 121, when control surface and monitoring and management were the causes of 
incidents, they could be identified as either critical or less severe equipment problems. When 
navigation was the cause of incidents, it was always identified as less severe. 
For Part 135, when landing gear and monitoring and management were the causes of incidents, 
they could be identified as either critical or less severe equipment problems. When 
communication was the cause, it was always identified as less severe. 
For Part 91, when electrical or power was the cause, it could be identified as either critical or less 
severe equipment problems. When landing gear was the cause, it was always identified as a 
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critical equipment problem. When communication, monitoring and management, and navigation 
were the causes, they were always identified as less severe. 
Table 8.  Percent incidents by SCFM categories for different aircraft equipment problems 
(with tall poles highlighted) 
 
SCFM categories 
Aircraft equipment 
problem for Part 121 
Aircraft equipment 
problem for Part 135 
Aircraft equipment 
problem for Part 91 
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Automated Flight 
Controls 
3% 7% 4% 3% 5% 3% 3% 8% 4% 
Brakes 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 3% 5% 3% 5% 
Communication 1% 5% 2% 2% 15% 5% 3% 25% 7% 
Control Surface 11% 11% 11% 5% 6% 5% 4% 3% 4% 
Electrical / Power 8% 5% 7% 8% 1% 6% 13% 11% 13% 
Environmental Control 
System 
10% 7% 9% 5% 6% 5% 4% 1% 3% 
Fuel System 3% 2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 5% 2% 5% 
Furnishings and 
equipment 
2% 4% 2% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Hydraulics / Pneumatic 10% 5% 8% 3% 1% 3% 2% 1% 2% 
Icing 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
Landing Gear 7% 8% 7% 16% 12% 15% 18% 8% 16% 
Miscellaneous 1% 2% 2% 0% 8% 3% 1% 2% 1% 
Monitoring and 
management 
11% 13% 11% 14% 17% 14% 7% 11% 7% 
Navigation 4% 16% 8% 3% 11% 5% 3% 12% 5% 
Oil System 3% 1% 3% 3% 0% 2% 3% 1% 2% 
Propulsion System 17% 6% 14% 23% 6% 19% 26% 5% 22% 
Structures 4% 5% 4% 5% 6% 6% 4% 5% 4% 
Weather system 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Table 9 compares percent incidents caused by SCFM breakdown, whether or not the incident 
results in maintenance action. The same top three SCFM tall poles for each FAR Part were 
observed regardless of the incidents results (i.e., with or without maintenance action). Part 121 
had propulsion system, control surface, and monitoring and management as the top three tall 
poles. Part 135 had propulsion system, landing gear, and monitoring and management as the top 
tall poles. Part 91 had propulsion system, landing gear, and electrical or power as the top three 
tall poles. Across all FAR Parts, propulsion system was the tallest pole. 
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Table 9.  Percent incidents by SCFM categories with incidents results (with top three tall 
poles highlighted) 
SCFM categories 
Incident results for 
Part 121 
Incident results for 
Part 135 
Incident results for 
Part 91 
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Automated Flight 
Controls 
3% 4% 2% 3% 4% 4% 
Brakes 2% 2% 5% 3% 6% 5% 
Communication 2% 2% 3% 5% 4% 7% 
Control Surface 13% 11% 6% 5% 4% 4% 
Electrical / Power 8% 7% 7% 6% 14% 13% 
Environmental Control 
System 
10% 9% 6% 5% 3% 3% 
Fuel System 3% 3% 4% 3% 5% 5% 
Furnishings and 
equipment 
2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Hydraulics / Pneumatic 9% 8% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
Icing 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Landing Gear 8% 7% 18% 15% 18% 16% 
Miscellaneous 1% 2% 0% 3% 1% 1% 
Monitoring and 
management 
12% 11% 13% 14% 7% 7% 
Navigation 4% 8% 3% 5% 3% 5% 
Oil System 3% 3% 5% 2% 3% 2% 
Propulsion System 15% 14% 19% 19% 20% 22% 
Structures 5% 4% 4% 6% 5% 4% 
Weather system 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
In addition to trends over time periods and trends by SCFM category, trends as an association 
between time periods and SCFM category are analyzed next. The percentages of incidents by 
SCFM category for all four time periods were summarized in Figures 23 and 24. Because each 
time period had different numbers of reported incidents, the percentages of incidents by 
categories were computed with respect to each period. As such, the total percentage over all 
SCFM categories for any given time period is 100 percent.  
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For Part 121, the tall poles changed slightly over the time periods for combined aircraft 
equipment problem (as shown by highlighted cells in column “Critical + Less Severe” of Figure 
23). Propulsion system (#16) and monitoring and management (#13) were two consistent tall 
poles over the past 20 years. Control surface (#4) became a tall pole in the past 15 years. 
Navigation (#14) was a tall pole in 1993-1997, but was not a tall pole in the past 15 years. 
Environmental control system (#6) was a tall pole from 1998 to 2007, but was not a tall pole in 
other periods. Hydraulics or pneumatic (#9) recently became a tall pole during 2008-2012. 
When breaking the incidents into the ones with critical aircraft equipment problem, Part 121 tall 
poles changed slightly over the time periods (as shown by highlighted cells in column “Critical” 
of Figure 23). Propulsion system (#16) and environmental control system (#6) were two of the 
tall poles from 1993 to 2012, with propulsion system being the tallest pole. Monitoring and 
management (#13) was one of the tall poles in 1993-2007, but was not a tall pole in the last 5 
years. Control surface (#4) became a tall pole in the past 15 years. Hydraulics/ pneumatic (#9) 
recently became a tall pole in the past 5 years. Landing gear (#11) was one of the tall poles from 
1993 to 1997, but was not a tall pole in the past 15 years. The significant increase in the number 
of incident reports during 2007-2012 (from Figure 21a) was due to a noticeably significant 
increase in the percentage of hydraulics/ pneumatic (#9) problems. 
For less severe equipment problem, the Part 121 top three tall poles changed slightly over the 
time periods (column “Less Severe” in Figure 23). Navigation (#14) and monitoring and 
management (#13) were two of the tall poles in 1993-2012. Control surface (#4) became a tall 
pole in the past 10 years. Automatic flight controls (#1) were a tall pole from 1993 to 2002, but 
were not a tall pole in the past 10 years. The significant increase in the number of incident 
reports during 2007-2012 (from Figure 21b) was not due to any specific SCFM category (no 
noticeable significant increase in percent by a particular category), but rather the tall poles were 
proportionally contributing to the increase in incidents. 
For Part 135, the tall poles have changed slightly over the four time periods. Due to a small 
number of incident reports across all SCFM categories for both aircraft equipment problems, 
only the combined equipment problem (“Critical + Less Severe”) was analyzed. Propulsion 
system (#16) and landing gear (#11) were two consistent tall poles over the past 20 years. 
Monitoring and management (#13) was a tall pole from 1993 to 2002, but was not a tall pole in 
the past 10 years.  
For Part 91, tall poles have not changed significantly over the time periods for the combined 
equipment problem. Propulsion system (#16), landing gear (#11), and electrical or power (#5) 
were consistently three of the tall poles over the past 20 years. Communication (#3) was a tall 
pole in 1993-1997, but was not a tall pole in the past 15 years. Due to a small number of 
incidents across all SCFM categories for less severe equipment problem, its trend of the SCFM 
tall poles was excluded in the analysis. For Part 91 with critical equipment problems, the tall 
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poles did not change in the past 20 years. Propulsion system (#16), landing gear (#11), and 
electrical or power (#5) were the top three tall poles for these time periods.  
Generally, trends of the SCFM tall poles over time for incidents having a critical equipment 
problem were similar to those for all incidents regardless of aircraft equipment problems for 
Parts 121 and 91. This may be because 76% of all incidents were the ones with a critical 
equipment problem. 
Figure 24 shows the breakdown of incidents by SCFM category considering the results of the 
incidents (with or without maintenance action). Trends of the SCFM tall poles over time for all 
FAR Parts for all incident results (i.e., with or without maintenance action) were the same as 
those in column “Critical + Less Severe” equipment problem of Figure 23. However, they were 
reported in this figure to facilitate the comparison. Due to the small number of incidents, Part 
135 was excluded. Clearly, trends of the SCFM tall poles over time for incidents resulting in 
maintenance action were the same as those for all results for Parts 121 and 91.  
For Part 121, the tall poles had changed slightly over the three time periods for incidents 
resulting in maintenance action. Propulsion system, control surface, and monitoring and 
management constantly were the top three tall poles from 1999 to 2012. Hydraulics or pneumatic 
recently became a tall pole during 2008-2012. Environmental control system was a tall pole from 
1999 to 2007, but was not a tall pole from 2008 to 2012. For Part 91 (Figure 24), the tall poles 
did not change from 1999 to 2012. Propulsion system, landing gear, and electrical or power were 
the top three tall poles across all three time periods. 
 
 3. REVIEW OF VEHICLE HEALTH MANAGEMENT (VHM) ISSUES AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH NEEDS 
This section contains a review of subject matter experts’ safety priority lists and research studies 
pertaining to VHM issues. The study specifically focuses on VHM issues related to the MVS 
Technical Challenge (TC2). 
3.1. CAST Safety Enhancements Reserved for Future Implementation (SERFIs) 
The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was established in 1998 in response to several 
commercial aviation accidents in the late 1990s (Ref. 5). It applies an integrated, data-driven 
strategy to reduce commercial aviation fatality risk in the United States and promote new 
government and industry safety initiatives throughout the world.   
Under the direction of a government and an industry co-chair, CAST sets overall policy and 
oversees the activities of the following working groups: Joint Safety Analysis Teams (JSATs) 
and Joint Safety Implementation Teams (JSITs). JSATs perform in-depth data analyses of a 
particular accident category, and then identify intervention strategies to eliminate potential 
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precursors and contributing factors to the accidents. JSITs develop safety enhancements based on 
the intervention strategies identified by the JSATs (Ref. 6). 
In addition to the current Safety Enhancements (SEs) in the CAST plan, there are 54 Safety 
Enhancements Reserved for Future Implementation (SERFIs), Research SERFIs, and Research 
& Development Safety Enhancements (R&D SEs) that were developed by various JSIT activities 
but were not approved by CAST for implementation on the active Safety Plan.   
An assessment of the CAST SERFIs against the MVS research products was conducted. The 
result of this assessment determined that MVS products are aligned with only one SERFI:  R&D 
Safety Enhancement 118, Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS). HUMS is a R&D 
project focused on preventing Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) accidents and 
incidents in commercial aviation (Refs. 7, 8, 9). While it contains high ratings of overall 
effectiveness and feasibility, HUMS was considered by the JSIT to require additional research 
before realizing the full potential to reduce accidents.  As such, it was recommended to CAST as 
a research project, and it became a Safety Enhancement Reserved for Future Implementation 
(SERFI). 
Because SE 118 was recommended for research, a Detailed Implementation Plan delineating 
specific actions and outputs, identifying responsible organizations, and estimating financial 
resources required for completion was never developed.  The JSIT merely developed the 
following Statement of Work outline for the HUMS project:  
Conduct research and develop technology for:  
• Detection, prediction and/or annunciation of impending equipment failures. 
• Detection and annunciation of inappropriate settings that may affect safe flight. 
• Real time decision making support for maintenance and operations. 
• Smart alerting systems that provide real time assistance to flight crews with on-board 
system failures and include diagnostics, prioritization schemes and elimination of nuisance 
alerts. 
MVS products applicable to SE 118 are: Hybrid Structural Damage Diagnosis (MVS-1.1), 
Vehicle Integrated Propulsion Research (MVS-2.1), Mitigating Turbomachinery Structural 
Failure (MVS-2.2), Vehicle Level Diagnostics and Integration (MVS-3.1), and Physics-Based 
Models and Algorithms for Wiring Fault Detection (MVS-3.2). 
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3.2. NTSB Most-Wanted List 
Every year the NTSB publishes a most-wanted list of transportation safety priorities for various 
transportation modes (e.g., aviation, highway, etc.) Although most of the NASA AvSP research 
is directed toward commercial aircraft operations, a portion of the work in MVS may be 
applicable to the issue of “Improve General Aviation Safety”, which is currently on the NTSB’s 
Most Wanted List (Ref. 10). A specific recommendation that may relate to MVS research is:  
“Aircraft maintenance workers should also be required to undergo recurrent training to keep 
them up to date with the best practices for inspecting and maintaining electrical systems, circuit 
breakers, and aged wiring.”  
In addition, the NTSB also issues safety recommendations as a result of accident investigations 
and other safety concerns that arise. Some recent open recommendations (during 2008-2013) that 
may be related to MVS research are listed in Table 10. 
Table 10. Recent NTSB Safety Recommendations related to MVS research 
Recommendation # Recommendation 
A-13-001 Establish duty-time regulations for maintenance personnel working under 
14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135, 145, and 91 Subpart K 
that take into consideration factors such as start time, workload, shift 
changes, circadian rhythms, adequate rest time, and other factors shown 
by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to 
affect maintenance crew alertness. 
A-13-002 Encourage operators and manufacturers to develop and implement best 
practices for conducting maintenance under 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations Parts 135 and 91 Subpart K, including, but not limited to, the 
use of work cards for maintenance tasks, especially those involving 
safety-critical functions, that promote the recording and verification of 
delineated steps in the task that, if improperly completed, could lead to a 
loss of control. 
A-13-003 Require that personnel performing maintenance or inspections under 14 
Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135, 145, and 91 Subpart K 
receive initial and recurrent training on human factors affecting 
maintenance that includes a review of the causes of human error, 
including fatigue, its effects on performance, and actions individuals can 
take to prevent the development of fatigue. 
A-12-068 Develop fire detection system performance requirements for the early 
detection of fires originating within cargo containers and pallets and, once 
developed, implement the new requirements. 
A-10-096 Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other 
critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing 
the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates proficiency in the 
task. 
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3.3. NRC Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics  
The National Research Council (NRC) is a part of the National Academy of Sciences with the 
purpose of advising the government on matters of science and technology. It was organized in 
1916 and has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences 
and the National Academy of Engineering. The NRC conducted a decadal survey of civil 
aeronautics to assist NASA in developing a decadal strategy for federal aeronautics research in 
2006 (Ref. 11). The report describes research that is deemed necessary to further the state of the 
art in areas consistent with NASA’s legislative charter resulting in significant long term impact 
on national aeronautics.  The survey study prioritized the identified research & technology 
(R&T) challenges in terms of supporting infrastructure, mission alignment, lack of alternative 
sponsors, and appropriate risk level according to NASA’s civil aeronautics research program. 
The NRC examined a total of 89 distinct R&T challenges that were categorized into five R&T 
areas. The five areas were 
A: Aerodynamics and aero acoustics. 
B: Propulsion and power. 
C: Materials and structures. 
D: Dynamics, navigation, and control, and avionics. 
E: Intelligent and autonomous systems, operations and decision making, human 
integrated systems, and networking and communications. 
Assessment of R&T challenges against the MVS research products was conducted. Table 11 
presents only the R&T challenges applicable to the MVS. For each challenge, numeric value 
following the letter of the R&T area indicates the NASA priority. The smaller the numeric, the 
higher the priority the challenge had.  
Table 11. R&T Challenges applicable to the MVS TC 
Challenge R&T Area Description 
B3 Propulsion and power Intelligent engines and mechanical power systems 
capable of self-diagnosis and reconfiguration 
between shop visits 
C1 Materials and structures Integrated vehicle health management 
D5 Dynamics, navigation, and 
control, and avionics 
Fault tolerant and integrated vehicle health 
management systems 
 
The committee also identified two key barriers to achieving the aeronautics objectives: (1) 
certification and (2) change management.  As systems become more complex and 
nondeterministic, methods to certify new technologies become more difficult to validate. It is 
essential for NASA, with collaboration with the FAA, to conduct research on certification 
methods and on methods to introduce the anticipated change.  
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3.4. Future Aviation Safety Team Areas of Change 
The European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) and the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) in the USA sponsor the Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) (Ref. 12).  FAST 
performs analyses of ongoing and future changes affecting the global aviation system with the 
goal of revealing unidentified safety hazards. Beginning in 2001, FAST compiled a database of 
Areas of Change (AoC). An AoC is defined as “any phenomenon that will affect the safety of the 
aviation system either from within or from important domains external to aviation” (Ref. 13).  
The current database that contains AoC was recently updated on November 15, 2013.  Potential 
safety hazards associated with each AoC are also available in the database.  Table 12 presents 
AoCs that are related to the MVS Technical Challenge. Some of the hazards cited include:  
? high complexity vehicle health management systems that are unable to yield to software 
certification techniques that exist today 
? failure to detect aircraft structural damage due to particle shedding, de-lamination, and 
high-current lightning strikes 
? certification challenges due to non-deterministic nature of Artificial Intelligence outputs 
from integrated modular architecture 
? the shortage of certified maintenance personnel 
? inadequate maintenance skills and trainings 
? crew’s fatigue causing maintenance errors. 
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nd
er
 
D
O
-1
78
C
1  g
ui
de
lin
es
 –
 th
e 
ve
ry
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
pr
oo
f 
th
at
 u
nd
er
 a
ll 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fa
ilu
re
 c
on
di
tio
ns
, a
 
si
ng
le
 fa
ilu
re
 in
 o
ne
 p
ar
tit
io
n 
w
ill
 n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t o
th
er
 
pa
rti
tio
ns
. 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
1  D
O
-1
78
C
 is
 S
of
tw
ar
e 
C
on
si
de
ra
tio
ns
 in
 A
irb
or
ne
 S
ys
te
m
s a
nd
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t C
er
tif
ic
at
io
n.
 T
hi
s r
ep
la
ce
s D
O
-1
78
B
 a
s t
he
 p
rim
ar
y 
do
cu
m
en
t b
y 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ce
rti
fic
at
io
n 
au
th
or
iti
es
 su
ch
 a
s F
A
A
, E
A
SA
 a
nd
 T
ra
ns
po
rt 
C
an
ad
a 
w
ill
 a
pp
ro
ve
 a
ll 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 so
ftw
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
ae
ro
sp
ac
e 
sy
st
em
s. 
Th
e 
ne
w
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s c
al
le
d 
D
O
-1
78
C
/E
D
-1
2C
 a
nd
 w
as
 c
om
pl
et
ed
 in
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
1 
an
d 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
R
TC
A
, I
nc
. i
n 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1.
 It
 b
ec
am
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
fo
r s
al
e 
an
d 
us
e 
in
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
12
. R
TC
A
, I
nc
. (
kn
ow
n 
as
 R
ad
io
 T
ec
hn
ic
al
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 fo
r A
er
on
au
tic
s, 
or
ig
in
al
ly
 fo
un
de
d 
in
 1
93
5,
 a
nd
 u
nt
il 
its
 re
-in
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
in
 1
99
1 
as
 a
 p
riv
at
e 
no
t-
fo
r-
pr
of
it 
co
rp
or
at
io
n)
 is
 a
 U
S 
vo
lu
nt
ee
r o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
th
at
 d
ev
el
op
s t
ec
hn
ic
al
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
fo
r u
se
 b
y 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
au
th
or
iti
es
 a
nd
 b
y 
in
du
st
ry
. I
t h
as
 o
ve
r 
20
0 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s a
nd
 o
ve
ra
ll 
ac
ts
 a
s a
n 
ad
vi
so
ry
 b
od
y 
to
 th
e 
FA
A
. 
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itl
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D
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ia
l H
az
ar
ds
 
22
6 
– 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 o
f 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
pe
rs
on
ne
l  
Th
e 
sh
or
ta
ge
 o
f c
er
tif
ie
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
er
so
nn
el
 m
ay
 
re
su
lt 
in
 lo
w
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
se
rv
ic
in
g 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
w
ith
 a
 c
on
co
m
ita
nt
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
lia
bi
lit
y 
of
 b
ot
h 
ne
w
 a
nd
 a
gi
ng
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 S
er
vi
ci
ng
 o
f a
dv
an
ce
d 
av
io
ni
cs
 w
ill
 re
qu
ire
 sp
ec
ia
liz
ed
 sk
ill
s, 
ye
t t
ra
in
in
g 
in
 
di
sc
ip
lin
es
 su
ch
 a
s c
om
po
si
te
 m
at
er
ia
l r
ep
ai
r, 
no
nd
es
tru
ct
iv
e 
in
sp
ec
tio
n,
 so
lid
-s
ta
te
 
el
ec
tro
ni
cs
/a
vi
on
ic
s/
bu
ilt
-in
 te
st
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t, 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f t
ro
ub
le
sh
oo
tin
g 
an
d 
hu
m
an
 fa
ct
or
 is
 
cu
rr
en
tly
 o
nl
y 
an
 o
pt
io
n 
w
ith
in
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 
cu
r r
ic
ul
a.
 A
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f n
on
-c
er
tif
ie
d 
st
af
f 
in
cr
ea
se
s, 
th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 c
he
ck
 th
ei
r w
or
k 
in
cr
ea
se
s. 
? 
A
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
of
 p
oo
r q
ua
lit
y 
w
or
k 
ei
th
er
 b
ec
au
se
 
of
 ti
m
e 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 o
r b
ec
au
se
 e
rr
or
s a
re
 n
ot
 
de
te
ct
ed
. 
? 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
er
tif
ie
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
er
so
nn
el
 d
ue
 to
 ti
gh
te
ni
ng
 o
f 
co
nt
ro
ls
 o
n 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s, 
lim
ita
tio
n 
of
 
w
or
ki
ng
 h
ou
rs
, v
is
io
n 
te
st
s, 
et
c.
 
? 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 in
sp
ec
to
rs
. 
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0 
- P
ar
ad
ig
m
 sh
ift
 
fr
om
 p
ap
er
 b
as
ed
 to
 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
ba
se
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 re
co
rd
s 
an
d 
da
ta
ba
se
s  
In
 th
e 
fu
tu
re
, c
om
pl
ex
, i
nt
eg
ra
te
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
w
ill
 re
qu
ire
 
m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
au
to
m
at
io
n 
fo
r f
au
lt 
de
te
ct
io
n,
 
di
ag
no
si
s, 
an
d 
re
so
lu
tio
n.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, n
ew
 d
ia
gn
os
tic
 
an
d 
pr
og
no
st
ic
 sa
fe
ty
 a
na
ly
si
s w
ill
 re
qu
ire
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
tra
ck
in
g 
of
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 a
ct
io
ns
.  
? 
D
eg
ra
da
tio
n 
in
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 le
ga
cy
 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 p
ap
er
-b
as
ed
 b
ut
 
ar
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
in
g 
to
 a
 c
om
pu
te
riz
ed
 fo
rm
at
 
? 
In
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 sk
ill
 se
ts
 a
m
on
g 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
pe
rs
on
ne
l b
ec
au
se
 o
f c
ha
ng
in
g 
pr
oc
es
se
s, 
to
ol
s, 
an
d 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 to
 su
pp
or
t t
he
 n
ew
 c
om
pu
te
riz
ed
 
sy
st
em
s 
? 
Po
or
 ta
sk
 v
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
? 
La
ck
 o
f c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
nd
 
fli
gh
t c
re
w
s 
? 
D
is
co
nn
ec
t i
n 
pr
oc
es
se
s f
or
 h
an
dl
in
g 
th
e 
fo
rm
al
 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
lo
g;
 m
an
ua
l, 
vi
a 
au
to
m
at
io
n 
?  
Fa
ilu
re
 o
f p
ro
ce
ss
es
 to
 fu
lly
 in
fo
rm
 c
re
w
 o
f 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 p
re
-f
lig
ht
 a
irc
ra
ft 
st
at
us
 d
ue
 to
 n
ew
 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
lo
g 
en
try
 fo
rm
at
s;
 m
is
m
at
ch
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
m
an
ua
l, 
pa
pe
r l
og
s a
nd
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
lo
gs
 
?  
A
s w
ith
 a
ny
 d
ig
ita
l s
ys
te
m
, i
t i
s n
ot
 e
no
ug
h 
to
 
m
ak
e 
“d
ig
ita
l”
 c
op
ie
s o
f p
ap
er
 (s
ca
nn
in
g,
 P
D
Fs
). 
It 
is
 c
rit
ic
al
 to
 b
ui
ld
 in
 “
sm
ar
t”
 ta
gs
, i
nd
ex
es
 a
nd
 
cr
os
s-
re
fe
re
nc
es
 so
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ca
n 
be
 n
av
ig
at
ed
 
an
d 
“f
ou
nd
.”
 
? 
Lo
ss
 o
f a
cc
es
s t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
du
rin
g 
tra
ns
iti
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 to
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
re
co
rd
s. 
? 
C
um
be
rs
om
e 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 h
is
to
ric
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
re
co
rd
s r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
ke
pt
 b
y 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
ow
ne
r. 
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nt
ia
l H
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ds
 
23
6 
- I
nc
re
as
in
g 
us
e 
of
 v
irt
ua
l m
oc
ku
ps
 
fo
r m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
tra
in
in
g 
an
d 
fo
r 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
D
ig
ita
l/e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
m
oc
k-
up
s a
re
 n
ow
 b
ei
ng
 a
do
pt
ed
 
by
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 a
s s
ub
st
itu
te
s f
or
 th
e 
ph
ys
ic
al
 m
oc
k-
up
s. 
It 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
cu
rr
en
t d
ig
ita
l 
m
oc
k -
up
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
 to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
hu
m
an
 
m
od
el
in
g 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y 
do
es
 n
ot
 p
er
m
it 
to
ta
l 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
/a
ss
em
bl
y 
ta
sk
 si
m
ul
at
io
n 
(p
er
ha
ps
 2
-5
 
ye
ar
s a
w
ay
). 
W
hi
le
 a
ny
 sa
fe
ty
 re
la
te
d 
ris
k 
is
 lo
w
, i
f a
 
si
tu
at
io
n 
is
 n
ot
 re
co
gn
iz
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
de
si
gn
 p
ha
se
, i
t 
w
ill
 n
ot
 e
m
er
ge
 o
r b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
un
til
 a
ss
em
bl
y 
of
 
fir
st
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 T
hi
s r
es
ul
ts
 in
 a
 c
os
t/s
ch
ed
ul
e 
pe
na
lty
 
an
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
m
ai
nt
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
is
su
es
. 
? 
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 e
rr
or
s a
ris
in
g 
fr
om
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t a
nd
 re
al
 li
ne
 
op
er
at
io
ns
. 
? 
Fa
ilu
re
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
co
nf
ig
ur
at
io
n 
co
nt
ro
l b
et
w
ee
n 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 si
m
ul
at
or
s a
nd
 a
ct
ua
l a
irc
ra
ft 
ph
ys
ic
al
 h
ar
dw
ar
e.
 
 Th
is
 sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
a 
ha
za
rd
 if
: 
?  
Th
e 
us
e 
of
 v
ar
io
us
 le
ve
ls
 o
f s
im
ul
at
io
n 
ar
e 
ca
re
fu
lly
 a
ss
es
se
d 
an
d 
us
ed
 a
cc
or
di
ng
ly
. 
? 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
in
cl
ud
e 
te
st
in
g 
th
at
 e
ns
ur
es
 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
tra
ns
fe
r o
f l
ea
rn
in
g 
fr
om
 
si
m
ul
at
or
 to
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
. 
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1 
- O
pe
ra
tio
na
l 
te
m
po
 a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ns
 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
fa
tig
ue
 
am
on
g 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
pe
rs
on
ne
l  
A
s r
es
ul
t o
f i
nc
re
as
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l p
re
ss
ur
e 
on
 a
irl
in
es
 
ov
er
 th
e 
la
st
 1
0-
15
 y
ea
rs
 th
er
e 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 c
on
du
ct
 th
ei
r 
w
or
k.
 T
he
 n
um
be
r o
f m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s p
er
 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
ha
s b
ee
n 
re
du
ce
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 e
ve
n 
ta
ki
ng
 
in
to
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
th
at
 th
e 
pr
es
en
t f
le
et
 d
em
an
ds
 le
ss
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 d
ue
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
qu
al
ity
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
ro
gr
am
s. 
O
nl
y 
in
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 ta
sk
s s
uc
h 
as
 p
rim
ar
y 
fli
gh
t c
on
tro
l 
w
or
k 
th
is
 ra
tio
 is
 st
ill
 m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 n
or
m
al
. F
or
 a
lm
os
t 
al
l o
th
er
 ta
sk
s t
he
re
 a
re
 n
ow
 ju
st
 sp
ot
s c
he
ck
s o
f 1
0-
15
%
 o
f t
he
 w
or
k 
ac
tu
al
ly
 p
er
fo
rm
ed
 b
y 
so
m
eo
ne
 
el
se
. C
on
tra
ct
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
er
so
nn
el
 h
av
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 to
 se
ek
 o
ut
 o
ve
rti
m
e 
to
 m
ax
im
iz
e 
th
ei
r 
in
co
m
e.
 A
 la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s s
til
l h
av
e 
no
t s
et
 
m
ax
im
um
 d
ur
at
io
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 ti
m
es
 fo
r m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
st
af
f l
ik
e 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
fo
r p
ilo
ts
. D
ue
 to
 ti
gh
t d
ay
tim
e 
fli
gh
t s
ch
ed
ul
es
, t
he
re
 is
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fo
r 
ni
gh
ts
hi
ft 
op
er
at
io
ns
 (t
he
re
 is
 a
 k
no
w
n 
sa
fe
ty
 ri
sk
 
w
he
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 u
nd
er
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
in
 n
ig
ht
 h
ou
rs
 o
n 
co
m
pl
ic
at
ed
 w
or
k)
 o
n 
th
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n.
 
? 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
in
 st
af
f, 
ec
on
om
ic
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
to
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 te
ch
ni
ci
an
s p
lu
s s
hi
fts
 to
w
ar
d 
ni
gh
t s
ch
ed
ul
es
 fo
r c
rit
ic
al
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 in
cr
ea
se
 
th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 fa
tig
ue
 a
nd
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 e
rr
or
s. 
D
ue
 to
 ti
gh
t d
ay
tim
e 
fli
gh
t s
ch
ed
ul
es
, t
he
re
 is
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fo
r n
ig
ht
sh
ift
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n.
 
?  
M
an
y 
co
un
tri
es
 st
ill
 h
av
e 
no
t s
et
 m
ax
im
um
 
du
ra
tio
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 ti
m
es
 fo
r m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 st
af
f l
ik
e 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
fo
r p
ilo
ts
. 
? 
N
um
be
r o
f m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s p
er
 a
irc
ra
ft 
ha
s b
ee
n 
re
du
ce
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
. O
nl
y 
in
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 ta
sk
s s
uc
h 
as
 p
rim
ar
y 
fli
gh
t c
on
tro
l 
w
or
k 
is
 th
is
 ra
tio
 is
 st
ill
 m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 n
or
m
al
. 
? 
B
as
ed
 o
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
sa
le
s f
or
ec
as
ts
 in
 n
on
-W
es
te
rn
 
m
ar
ke
ts
, t
he
re
 w
ill
 b
e 
a 
w
or
ld
w
id
e 
sh
or
ta
ge
 o
f 
qu
al
ifi
ed
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
er
so
nn
el
. 
? 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
e,
 sa
fe
ty
 c
ul
tu
re
, a
nd
 tr
ib
al
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
a 
bi
gg
er
 is
su
e 
th
an
 o
ve
rw
or
k 
an
d 
fa
tig
ue
. 
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1 
– 
In
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
ne
w
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
 fo
r 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 st
af
f 
IA
TA
2  T
ra
in
in
g 
an
d 
Q
ua
lif
ic
at
io
n 
In
iti
at
iv
e 
(IT
Q
I)
 
fo
r M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 is
 a
 re
ce
nt
 IA
TA
 in
iti
at
iv
e.
 It
 is
 
ce
nt
er
ed
 o
n 
co
m
pe
te
nc
y 
ba
se
d 
tra
in
in
g 
an
d 
as
se
ss
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 w
ill
 re
qu
ire
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
co
m
pe
te
nc
ie
s. 
A
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
va
lid
at
ed
 
th
ro
ug
h 
m
ee
tin
gs
 w
ith
 o
rig
in
al
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
, a
irl
in
e 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
nd
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
. I
A
TA
 h
as
 w
or
ke
d 
cl
os
el
y 
w
ith
 IC
A
O
 
to
 d
ev
el
op
 th
is
 m
at
er
ia
l. 
Th
e 
A
ir 
N
av
ig
at
io
n 
C
ou
nc
il 
(A
N
C
) w
as
 b
rie
fe
d 
in
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
10
 o
n 
th
e 
pr
og
re
ss
. 
La
ck
 o
f I
C
A
O
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
m
at
er
ia
l o
n 
ho
w
 c
om
pe
te
nc
y 
ba
se
d 
tra
in
in
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3.5. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) of the United State Navy solicited for research 
proposals in four research areas during Fiscal Year 2013 (Ref. 14). Two out of four research 
areas were likely to be related to MVS: BAA 121 – Advanced Aircraft Power Systems (for 
research up to four years); and BAA 124 – Propulsion and Power System, Condition Based 
Maintenance, Prognostics, Diagnostics, and Health Monitoring (for research up to five years).  
Under BAA 121, one of Navy power system needs was “diagnostics, prognostics, and health 
management for electrical power and wiring systems to bring about improvements in readiness, 
maintenance, safety, and cost” (Ref. 14). 
Under BAA 124, Navy seeks to “develop propulsion and power system condition based 
maintenance, prognostic, diagnostic, and health monitoring technologies to improve aircraft 
safety, reliability, maintainability, affordability, and availability” (Ref. 14). 
3.6. Industry 
Several aerospace corporations are actively developing technology related to the MVS research:  
General Electric (GE) Sensing and Inspection Technologies (Ref. 15); Airplane Health 
Management services at Boeing (Refs. 16, 17); Aircraft Maintenance Analysis (AIRMAN) at 
Airbus (Refs. 18, 19, 20); and Health and Usage Management Systems (HUMS) at UTC 
Aerospace Systems (Ref. 21). 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
NTSB accident data (1996-2010) and FAA incident data (1996-2010) were examined across four 
operational categories: Federal Aviation Regulations Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Non-
Scheduled Part 135, and Part 91. In addition, an analysis of the types of aircraft involved in the 
accidents and incidents was performed. The aircraft were divided into groups according to 
engine type. The system /component failure/malfunction (SCFM) data were examined both by 
operation category and by aircraft engine type. 
In Part 121 operations, jet aircraft were involved in 81 percent of the accidents and 73 percent of 
the incidents. In contrast, Part 91 and Non-Scheduled Part 135 accidents and incidents occurred 
predominantly on aircraft with reciprocating engines. A large number of Scheduled Part 135 
accidents (30 percent) and incidents (51 percent) occurred on turboprop aircraft. More than fifty 
percent of the jet fatalities occurred in accidents that included SCFM, compared with only 
thirteen percent of the fatalities in single-engine aircraft. 
Twenty-two percent of multiple-engine (reciprocating) aircraft accidents involved SCFM; this 
was the highest percentage among all engine types. Interestingly, the lowest percentage was 
associated with single-engine (reciprocating) aircraft (14 percent). Among incidents, however, 
58 to 61 percent of jet, turbo-prop, and multiple-engine (reciprocating) aircraft incidents 
involved SCFM, compared with 31 percent for single-engine incidents. 
Across all flight categories (i.e., FAR Parts 121, 135, and 91), the most common systems 
involved in SCFM accidents and incidents were the engine and landing gear. In general, failures 
or malfunctions of either the landing gear or hydraulic systems result in less severe outcomes 
(fewer fatalities and less aircraft destruction) than other systems, whereas failures or 
malfunctions of either the structure or flight control systems result in more severe outcomes. 
Similar observations were found when accidents and incidents were examined by aircraft engine 
types. 
The SCFM related incidents analysis of the ASRS dataset resulted in 20,874 reports during 
1993-2012. Seventy-three percent of reported incidents were for Part 121, 22% for Part 91, and 
5% for Part 135. The SCFM incidents were further identified in the ASRS dataset as having 
critical or less severe aircraft equipment problems. When aircraft related incidents were caused 
by system component failure or malfunction, about 76% of the time they were identified as 
having a critical aircraft equipment problem. In addition to aircraft equipment problems, ASRS 
data provided the event results of the aircraft related incidents. The incidents can result in 
maintenance action, in unrelated maintenance action, or contained no information. The incidents 
resulting in maintenance action were applicable to the MVS Technical Challenge. As such, they 
were included in the analyses.  
For incidents with critical aircraft equipment problems, Part 121 had propulsion system, control 
surface, and monitoring and management as the top three SCFM categories (tall poles). Part 135 
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had propulsion system, landing gear, and monitoring and management as the top three tall poles. 
Part 91 had propulsion system, landing gear, and electrical or power as the top three tall poles. 
Across all FAR Parts, propulsion system was the tallest pole. The SCFM tall poles for all 
incidents regardless of aircraft equipment problems were the same as those for incidents 
identified as having a critical aircraft equipment problem across all FAR Parts. 
For Part 121, when control surface and monitoring and management were the causes of 
incidents, they could be identified as either critical or less severe equipment problems. When 
navigation was the cause of incidents, it was always identified as less severe. 
For Part 135, when landing gear and monitoring and management were the causes of incidents, 
they could be identified as either critical or less severe equipment problems. When 
communication was the cause, it was always identified as less severe. 
For Part 91, when electrical or power was the cause, it could be identified as either critical or less 
severe equipment problems. When landing gear was the cause, it was always identified as critical 
equipment problem. When communication, monitoring and management, and navigation were 
the causes, they were always identified as less severe. 
When comparing SCFM-related incidents, whether or not the incident results in maintenance 
action, the same top three SCFM tall poles for each FAR Part were observed. Part 121 had 
propulsion system, control surface, and monitoring and management as the top three tall poles. 
Part 135 had propulsion system, landing gear, and monitoring and management as the top three 
tall poles. Part 91 had propulsion system, landing gear, and electrical or power as the top three 
tall poles. Across all FAR Parts, propulsion system was the tallest pole. 
An assessment of the CAST SERFIs against the MVS research products was conducted. The 
result of the assessment determined that MVS products are aligned with only one SERFI:  R&D 
Safety Enhancement 118, Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS). Five out of six MVS 
products are applicable to SE 118, which are: Hybrid Structural Damage Diagnosis (MVS-1.1), 
Vehicle Integrated Propulsion Research (MVS-2.1), Mitigating Turbomachinery Structural 
Failure (MVS-2.2), Vehicle Level Diagnostics and Integration (MVS-3.1), and Physics-Based 
Models and Algorithms for Wiring Fault Detection (MVS-3.2). 
The majority of aviation safety improvements on the 2012 NTSB Most-Wanted List as well as 
recent open safety recommendations from 2008 to 2013 related to the MVS Technical Challenge 
involve reduction of maintenance crew errors due to crew’s fatigue and inadequate training. 
The NRC Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics related to the MVS research products was 
assessed. The survey study prioritized the identified research & technology (R&T) challenges 
according to NASA’s civil aeronautics research program. The NRC examined a total of 89 
distinct R&T challenges. Three challenges applicable to the MVS Technical Challenge were: B3 
– Intelligent engines and mechanical power systems capable of self-diagnosis and 
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reconfiguration between shop visits; C1 – Integrated vehicle health management; and D5 – Fault 
tolerant and integrated vehicle health management systems. The committee also identified two 
key barriers to achieving the aeronautics objectives: (1) certification and (2) change 
management. As systems become more complex and nondeterministic, methods to certify new 
technologies become more difficult to validate. It is essential for NASA, with collaboration with 
the FAA, to conduct research on certification methods and on methods to introduce the 
anticipated change.    
According to the Future Aviation Safety Team, areas of changes related to the MVS Technical 
Challenge are either vehicle-related or maintenance crew-related. Vehicle-related areas of 
changes were: AoC-14 Advanced vehicle health management systems; AoC-39 Increasing use of 
composite structural materials; and AoC-185 Introduction of Non-Deterministic Approaches 
(NDA) and artificial intelligence (self-learning) in aviation systems. Potential safety hazards 
associated with these vehicle-related areas of changes were: highly complex vehicle health 
management systems that are unable to yield to software certification techniques that exist today; 
failure to detect aircraft structural damage due to particle shedding, de-lamination, and high-
current lightning strikes; and certification challenges due to non-deterministic nature of Artificial 
Intelligence outputs from integrated modular architecture. Several maintenance crew-related 
areas of changes were driven by the shortage of certified maintenance personnel, inadequate 
maintenance skills and trainings, and crew’s fatigue causing maintenance errors.  
Future research direction in the MVS Technical Challenge is evidently strong as seen from Fiscal 
Year 2013 research solicitations from NAVAIR, and MVS-related technologies actively being 
developed by aviation industry leaders, including GE, Boeing, Airbus, and UTC Aerospace 
Systems. Given the highly complex vehicle heath management systems, modifications can be 
made in the future so that the VSST technical challenges address inadequate maintenance crew’s 
trainings and skills, and the certification methods of such systems as recommended by the 
NTSB, NRC, and FAST areas of change.  
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ACRONYMS 
AIDS = Accident/Incident Data System 
ALAR = Approach and Landing Accident Reduction 
ASIAS = Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
ASRS = Aviation Safety Reporting System 
AvSP = Aviation Safety Program 
CAST = Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR = Federal Aviation Regulations 
FAST = Future Aviation Safety Team 
HUMS = Health and Usage Monitoring Systems 
IATA = International Air Transport Association 
ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization 
JSAT = Joint Safety Analysis Team 
JSIT = Joint Safety Implementation Team 
MVS = Maintain Vehicle Safety between Major Inspections 
NAVAIR = Naval Air Systems Command 
NRC = National Research Council 
NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board 
R&D SE = Research & Development Safety Enhancement 
SCFM = System Component Failures or Malfunctions 
SE = Safety Enhancement 
SERFI = Safety Enhancements Reserved for Future Implementation 
VHM = Vehicle Health Management 
VSST = Vehicle Systems Safety Technology Project  
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